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ARGUMENT 
I. BOGM HAS FAILED TO ADDUCE ANY RATIONAL BASIS FOR ITS 
DEFINITION OF "ROCK AGGREGATE," AND HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY 
A DEFINITION IT TAILORED OUT OF WHOLE CLOTH. 
Remarkably missing from BOGM's Appellee Brief, despite its protestations and 
characterizations to the contrary, is any reference in the Record to geological definitions or 
similarly accepted authority defining "rock aggregate" in geological terms (Le., as 
unprocessed, naturally occurring material). Rather, Representative Christensen's statement 
is overworked in the extreme as the cited basis for the geological definition.1 BOGM 
proudly points to many hearings and many days of discussion prior to the promulgation of 
the Rule, and yet as support for its "technical" definition of "rock aggregate," can only 
reference several "concerned citizens" who themselves do not cite to any scientific or 
geological definitions of "rock aggregate," but rather only express support for the Rule.2 
1
 Interestingly, while claiming to rely on Representative Christensen's 
statements in the legislative record as the basis for its definition of "rock aggregate" on the 
one hand, BOGM on the other hand disparages any attempt to depose Representative 
Christensen, the sponsor of the Exemption, on the putative basis that his isolated statements 
in the legislative record cannot be considered indicative or determinative of legislative intent, 
which BOGM argues can only be divined from the individual intents of all legislators who 
affirmatively voted on the Exemption. 
2
 See, e ^ , the comments of Cindy Kromer, a self-described "nontechnical 
person whose training is in the behavioral sciences" who argued against any end-use 
1 
None of the "concerned citizens" even identify themselves as having an expertise to be 
commenting on the Rule and the proposed "technical" definitions, and only speak in 
generalities. 
Also remarkable is the admission by BOGM that after all of the input it received 
during the several hearings, including input from geologists and people trained in the 
industry, BOGM in the end adopted its previous definition of "rock aggregate" argued in the 
Larson Limestone case (Appellee Brief at 37), which position was taken long before any of 
the referenced hearings wherein BOGM allegedly came to its present definition after due 
deliberation. What has in fact happened is that, despite all the hearings BOGM held on the 
matter, because BOGM received no support for its "geological" definition of "rock 
aggregate" from a recognized or accepted scientific or geological perspective, it therefore 
reverted to its Larson Limestone position by default. In the process, BOGM ignored all 
contrary professional and geological information that was provided to it. Therefore. 
language (i.e., language defining "rock aggregate" in terms of a processed, commercial 
product) being included in the Rule. R. at 241, 322-24. At the same time that BOGM gives 
credence to Ms. Kromer's "nontechnical" objections about any end-use definitions of "rock 
aggregate," BOGM ignores or fails to take into account the considered and specialized 
opinion of an admittedly "technical" expert, Bryce Tripp, a geologist with the Utah 
Geological Survey, that "rock aggregate" is a end-use term, not a geological term. R. at 
259-60 (Memorandum from Bruce Tripp to Mary Ann Wright, Associate Director of Mining, 
DOGM). 
2 
BOGM's extensive citation to its numerous hearings and several references to opening up 
such hearings to the public is irrelevant and detracts from the real issue in this case, namely, 
that any real geological or other professional information in relation to "rock aggregate" was 
disregarded in favor of BOGM's pre-existing Larson Limestone position that is grounded 
neither in accepted nor recognized geologic or industry usage. This is because the term itself 
refers to processed end-use product, not to naturally occurring unprocessed materials. 
BOGM has foisted a "geological" meaning onto an otherwise commercial term of art, but did 
so without any geologic or industry basis. It has thus created its own arbitrary definition 
from whole cloth. 
II. AGCU HAS PROPERLY STATED AND SUPPORTED ITS FACTS. 
BOGM claims that AGCU has failed to support its facts or that it failed to state facts 
sufficient to support its position. However, a review of AGCU's Appellant Brief belies that 
contention. First, the most salient fact in this case is that BOGM has promulgated a Rule 
which is contrary to and undermines the clear language of the Act. Both the Act and the 
Rule are not only appended to and cited in AGCU's Appellant Brief but are undisputed as 
to their plain language. If nothing more were adduced as facts in this case, the Act and the 
Rule by themselves would be sufficient for this Court to examine and determine whether the 
Rule goes beyond, contradicts or undermines the Act. It is AGCU's position that it does. 
3 
This Court is in a position to look at the plain language of the Act, both prior to and after the 
Exemption being passed in 1987, look at the language of the Rule promulgated in 1999, and 
determine for itself whether the criteria set down by this Court in earlier cases as to 
rulemaking have been met. Second, AGCU has gone to the Record itself and has identified 
the specific material before BOGM that argued in favor of AGCU's position that "rock 
aggregate" is not a geological term, and cited to statements by BOGM's own personnel, as 
well as from independent persons (such as the zoning board administrator from Utah 
County), who came before BOGM with regard to that issue. In its initial Brief, AGCU noted 
that there was no one of any industry or geological experience or training who ever told the 
BOGM that "rock aggregate" as it came to be defined in the Rule was an accepted or 
acknowledged technical or geological term. 
In this same regard, it is interesting that whereas AGClPs Brief cited directly to the 
Record on this point and fulfilled its burden of marshaling the evidence, BOGM's Brief 
failed to cite to one quote presented to BOGM about "rock aggregate" being an accepted 
technical or geological term of art on the same basis as the accepted geological definitions 
of "sand" and "gravel" adopted in the Rule.3 While BOGM was able to avail itself of 
3
 It is true that Lowell Braxton, the director of DOGM, tried to make a case for 
the definition adopted in the Rule, but could not cite to any treatises or to any recognized 
4 
accepted geological understanding for defining "sand" and "gravel," it was unable to adduce 
similar authority for its definition of "rock aggregate." This disconnect arose because 
BOGM tried to superimpose its own manufactured geological definitions describing naturally 
occurring materials onto a commercial term denoting processed end-use. BOGM set out to 
define both apple terms and orange terms in its Rule, and tried to define them all in terms of 
apples. On the one hand, BOGM faults AGCU with failing to cite to the Record and to the 
supporting evidence, but on the other hand the best BOGM can muster for its proposed 
definition of "rock aggregate" is to cite to its worn out quotation of Representative 
Christensen, who no one claims is a geologist or particularly skilled in this area. 
As noted elsewhere in this Brief, the irony of this particular rulemaking exercise is 
that at the end of the day, BOGM ignores everything that has been presented to it in favor 
of going back to its pre-existing Larson Limestone position advanced and adopted long 
before it held the hearings at issue in this case. BOGM admits as much. (Appellee Brief at 
37.) Thus to cite to the Record is in many ways futile in this instance, because BOGM made 
it clear it did not rely on any of the material presented to it in its hearings for its decision in 
regard to the definition of "rock aggregate." Thus the marshaling of evidence process is a 
authority for that proposition. R. at 50-55, 333, 428-42. 
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fairly simple one, namely that the only support for the Rule's definition of "rock aggregate" 
came from the BOGM, internally (with perhaps some assistance from DOGM), but with little 
to no input from any other authoritative source. Given BOGM's stiff resistance to any 
discovery in this matter, marshaling all relevant and supporting evidence from BOGM's 
selectively compiled Record is necessarily a limited exercise. 
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW URGED BY BOGM IS NOT APPLICABLE 
IN THIS CASE. 
BOGM argues that an intermediate "tolerable level of reason" standard applies to its 
jurisdictional definitions of the statutory terms "sand," "gravel," and "rock aggregate." This 
deferential standard of review presupposes some level of fact-finding or application of law 
to fact. See Williams v. Public Service Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1987). Assuming for 
purposes of argument that such a standard of review were potentially available to BOGM 
(while still maintaining the argument made in AGCU's initial Brief that it is not), such a 
standard of review would still be inapplicable to this case for three fundamental reasons. 
1. The Rule confers extra-statutory powers on BOGM. 
First, "an agency's determination of its subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law," which is reviewed for correctness. Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm'n. 917 
P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1996). See also Allred v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 914 P.2d 1172. 
6 
1174 (Utah App. 1996) (a reviewing appellate court "affords no deference to [an] agency's 
interpretation or application of statutory terms," and applies a correction-of-error standard). 
As a statutorily-created body, BOGM can only exercise those powers delegated to it by 
statute. Harmon, 917 P.2d at 1084. Therefore, any exercise by BOGM of powers not 
otherwise granted to it by the Act becomes an issue of law, regardless of whether such an 
action purported to be a factfinding exercise or an application of law to facts. 
BOGM has been delegated authority "[t]o enact rules . . . that are reasonably 
necessary to carry out the purposes" of the Mined Land Reclamation Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-8-6. The Act applies to defined mining operations, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-4(8)(a); it 
does not apply to "the extraction of sand, gravel, and rock aggregate," Utah Code Ann. § 40-
8-4(8)(b). By defining "rock aggregate" (material specifically exempted from BOGM's 
statutorily-delegated provenance) to, in certain instances, actually constitute material and 
involve activity that would otherwise be under BOGM's statutorily-delegated provenance, 
BOGM is not only engaging in de facto legislation and partial repeal of the Act, but is acting 
beyond and outside the scope of its statutorily-delegated authority in doing so. BOGM does 
not have authority to regulate "rock aggregate" extraction. But by formulating heretofore 
unaccepted and unrecognized definitions of "rock aggregate," BOGM has not only acted 
outside of its statutorily-delegated powers, but has made the Act mean what the Act itself has 
7 
said it does not mean. By narrowly and arbitrarily defining "rock aggregate" to not mean 
"rock aggregate" in certain instances, BOGM has ensured that an Act that specifically 
exempts rock aggregate extraction in fact regulates a significant amount of total rock 
aggregate extraction. In other words, BOGM's self-validating exercise now provides BOGM 
expanded jurisdiction to regulate activities that the Act on its face otherwise exempts from 
BOGM's regulation. 
This Court has stated: 
Questions of legislative intent are considered questions of law, which are 
reviewed for correctness under our prior case law and section 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
Therefore, when a legislative intent concerning the specific question at issue 
can be derived through traditional methods of statutory construction, the 
agency's interpretation will be granted no deference and the statute will be 
interpreted in accord with its legislative intent. 
Morton Int'L Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 
1991). As such, no deference should be accorded to an agency's statutory interpretation that 
effectively holds that the statute says what it does not. In this case, BOGM cannot indulge 
in an interpretation of the Act that drastically curtails the scope of the Act's Exemption 
(namely, an interpretation of urock aggregate" operations that renders otherwise exempt 
activity liable to regulation if and when BOGM says so). 
8 
Clearly, BOGM's promulgation of a wholly novel and heretofore unrecognized "rock 
aggregate" definition that would partially repeal the Act by unilaterally expanding BOGM's 
scope of regulatory jurisdiction is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, or a matter of 
BOGM exceeding its statutorily-delegated authority, and not merely one of whether BOGM 
looked at enough facts and consulted enough opinions to support its definition of "rock 
aggregate." Such a unilateral, undelegated, self-validating and unaccountable expansion of 
regulatory authority is a jurisdictional question mandating a strict correction-of-error 
standard, not a fact question meriting a deferential rationality standard of review. 
2. BOGM's regulatory definition is an interpretation of the Act having 
general and prospective application, and does not entail any findings of 
fact or application of law in relation to a particular case or fact scenario. 
A reviewing appellate court "review[s] agency interpretations of general law under 
a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision." Magnesium 
Corp. of America v. Air Quality Bd.. 941 P.2d 653, 658 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in the absence of an express or implied 
grant of discretion to an agency to interpret statutory language, a reviewing appellate court 
reviews an agency's statutory construction as a question of law under a correction-of-error 
standard. Morton, 814 P.2d at 589. 
9 
"Factfinding" and "application of law to fact" suggest the presence of a particular fact 
situation associated with a particular case or controversy. Here (and unlike in the Morton 
case cited by BOGM as support for its standard-of-review argument), no particular fact 
situations or specific parties were involved. Instead, BOGM made an interpretation of 
general law—in the form of assigning technical definitions to certain statutory terms—with 
general and prospective legal effect. While BOGM may have canvassed scientific, industry 
and lay opinions as to the accepted and recognized meaning of certain statutory terms, its 
adoption of any such opinion involves no "factfinding" (no more than one court's survey and 
adoption of other jurisdictions' jurisprudence on a particular issue constitutes factfinding). 
Rather, adoption of technical definitions for certain statutory terms, and the particular 
prospective circumstances under which those terms may be operative in relation to any 
individual or operation, is by definition an interpretation of general law. It is even more so 
in regard to BOGM's proposed definition of "rock aggregate," which was not based on any 
accepted scientific or geologic understanding or definition, but rather was manufactured by 
BOGM in the absence of any clear scientific understanding or consensus. 
Furthermore, the Act gives no explicit grant to BOGM to interpret the language of the 
Act. The explicit grant given to BOGM is "[t]o enact rules . . . that are reasonably necessary 
to carry out the purposes of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-6. The purpose of the Act 
10 
"is to provide tha t . . . all mining in the state shall include plans for reclamation of the land 
affected." Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-3. Regulable mining activities have been identified, Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-8-4(8)(a), and certain non-regulable activities have been identified and 
exempted, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-8(b). Given that BOGM does not have jurisdiction to 
expand its own powers, or to unilaterally repeal portions of the Act in derogation of the 
elected Legislature, it is also clear that there is no implicit grant of authority for it to interpret 
the statute in a manner contrary to or that would detract from the Act's clear language and 
stated purpose. This accords with the legal presumption that any grant-of-authority questions 
should be construed against an agency in order to curtail unwarranted and unaccountable 
expansions of its jurisdiction. "To insure that the administrative powers of [an agency] are 
not over extended, any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved 
against the exercise thereof." Williams, 754 P.2d at 50 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
3. BOGM's definition of "rock aggregate" was not based on even the limited 
"factfinding" that it conducted on the matter. 
BOGM would claim that there has been a thoughtful fact-gathering process whereby 
BOGM: (1) had the benefit of scientific, educated, and experienced opinions presented to it 
regarding the accepted technical definition of "rock aggregate"; (2) carefully weighed each 
11 
of those several considered and informed opinions; and then (3) chose the definition that best 
comported with the most authoritative opinions.4 Perhaps if the Rule had developed as a 
result of such a process more deference could be accorded to BOGM. Unfortunately, as 
noted in AGCU's initial Brief, and as discussed in several points in this Brief, BOGM did 
not engage in such a process. While BOGM may appear to have sought and relied on 
opinion during the rulemaking process, the truth is that it ignored all of the testimony that 
came before it, and by its own admission resorted to its own pre-existing Larson Limestone 
rule crafted and in place long before any hearings in this matter were held. (Appellee Brief 
at 37.) Under such circumstances, this Court does not have to defer to any special expertise 
or training on the part of BOGM, given that such special expertise or training was not 
brought into play when adopting a non-technical definition of "rock aggregate" already 
manufactured by BOGM well before the rulemaking hearings in question. That is 
particularly true when BOGM is acting outside of its area of statutory delegation, as opposed 
to acting within such delegation. If, for example, BOGM were creating a Rule on how to 
4
 To the contrary, the analysis submitted by Lowell Braxton, Acting Director of 
BOGM, shows the detail to which BOGM went to respond to and counter every point raised 
by experts in the area (all opposing the proposed Rule), as well as BOGM's uncritical and 
perfunctory acceptance of points raised by non-experts (all supporting the Rule). R. at 428-
42. 
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best reclaim coal mines, an area clearly within its statutory delegation, then this Court 
should, of necessity, give deference to BOGM and to DOGM because of their respective 
members' training and experience in regulating the reclamation of coal mines. However, the 
issue in this case is not about BOGM's exercise of its statutorily-delegated powers, but rather 
about BOGM's regulation of matters outside of its statutorily-delegated powers entailing the 
consequent lack of sufficient training and skill that BOGM might otherwise possess in 
relation to its statutorily-delegated powers. 
IV. BOGM'S RULE WOULD FAIL TO PASS MUSTER EVEN UNDER BOGM'S 
PROPOSED REASONABLENESS TEST. 
BOGM argues that under its proposed intermediate standard of review, the Rule 
should be upheld for three reasons. Upon examination, the Rule fails to satisfy any one of 
the three reasons proffered by BOGM. 
1. The Rule expands BOGM's jurisdiction. 
For the reasons pointed out above, the Rule allows BOGM to regulate non-mining 
extractive operations that otherwise had been exempt from the Act's requirements. In other 
words, BOGM gave itself the authority to regulate non-mining operations (Le,, operations 
which presented none of the reclamation concerns addressed by the Act) as if they were in 
fact mining operations. 
13 
2. The "rock aggregate" definition is not "geologically based," and 
undermines rather than "corresponds with the overall purpose of the 
mining act." 
As the Record amply demonstrates, there is a disconnect between BOGM's definitions 
of "sand" and "gravel" on the one hand, and its definition of "rock aggregate" on the other. 
Whereas "sand" and "gravel" can be (but are not always) defined on the basis of accepted 
and recognized geological terms, the "rock aggregate" definition promulgated by BOGM has 
no corresponding basis in geological or scientific understanding. In fact, the testimony 
before BOGM was basically uniform in that such a term was a commercial reference to 
processed end product, and was not an accepted or recognized term for naturally occurring 
unprocessed material. BOGM ignored such input to create a novel and heretofore 
unrecognized geological term, apparently based on no other parameters or considerations 
than its prior Larson Limestone position. (Appellee Brief at 37.) 
BOGM tries unconvincingly to divorce end-use product from excavation activity, 
arguing that surface disturbance is regulable in and of itself regardless of the end-use product 
being extracted. If that were the case, there would be no need for the Act and the Exemption 
to specify the particular end-use products that qualify certain types of extraction activity for 
exemption. Implicit in the Exemption's identification of such end-use products is the 
recognition that the nature of extraction is dependant upon and an outgrowth of the type of 
14 
end-use product being extracted. Otherwise, the Exemption could have and should have 
identified methodologies of excavation qualifying for exemption, rather than end-use 
products. By BOGM's reasoning, exploration of oil and gas may lose its exemption in 
certain instances yet to be defined by BOGM since exemption is entirely a function of 
surface disturbance and takes no account of the end-use products otherwise specifically 
identified in the Exemption. By BOGM's reasoning, the Exemption's identification of end-
use products that qualify for exemption is at best only a suggestion by the Legislature of the 
types of activities and operations that may qualify for exemption as BOGM sees fit. 
3. This Court never adopted the "rock aggregate" definition proffered by 
BOGM in Larson Limestone. 
The Larson Limestone court said that a regulable activity taking place concurrently 
and in conjunction with exempted activity subjected the exempted activity to regulation. In 
other words, the operator in that case could not take advantage of his rock aggregate 
operations in order to circumvent the Act and escape regulation of his mining operations. 
Larson Limestone does not stand as an affirmation or approval of BOGM's proposed 
definition of "rock aggregate." By BOGM's own admission, and as is apparent from a 
reading of the case, this Court never reached "the ultimate question of the 'rock aggregate' 
15 
definition" adopted by BOGM. To suggest that the Larson Limestone decision in any way 
affirms or supports that definition is misleading, in addition to having no basis in fact. 
V. THERE ARE VALID REASONS FOR ALLOWING FURTHER DISCOVERY 
IN THIS CASE. 
There are two areas where, as reflected in BOGM's own brief, there is a possibility 
of a need for discovery. First, as is noted throughout BOGM's Brief as well as its citations 
to the Record, BOGM relies heavily on the very short statement made by Representative 
Christensen at the time of the legislative vote on the Exemption. If for any reason it becomes 
necessary to gain further understanding of Representative Christensen's statement as it may 
relate to the meaning and scope of the Exemption, then it is only fair and proper that AGCU 
be given the opportunity to discover Christensen's intent by taking his deposition. 
Second, BOGM has challenged AGCU's use of a letter from DOGM attached to 
AGCU's Memorandum before the trial court as not being part of the Record. Aside from the 
fact that the Record is replete with references to DOGM's pre-Exemption position, the fact 
remains that that document is a governmental document and it was not made part of the 
Record by BOGM for its own internal purposes. (After this litigation was initiated, BOGM 
selected which materials to include in the Record). Therefore, if for any reason that 
contested exhibit becomes critical for the purpose of determining the interpretation by 
16 
DOGM and BOGM of the Act prior to the Exemption being passed, then once again it is only 
fair and proper that AGCU be given the opportunity to take discovery on that point to 
determine what materials then present in BOGM and DOGM's files were considered or 
relied upon by BOGM when making the Rule. 
As noted in AGCU's initial brief, the request for discovery which was denied by the 
trial court only comes to play if disputed items of fact need clarification. However, on the 
basis that the Record is sufficiently clear by itself then the request for discovery is not 
necessary, despite what AGCU considers a plain error by the trial court in not allowing it. 
CONCLUSION 
BOGM's definition of "rock aggregate" was manufactured by BOGM, and involves a 
misapplication of a purported technical definition of unprocessed in-situ material onto a commercial 
term of art referring to processed commercial end-use product. A review of the Record fails to 
adduce any expert or scientific testimony or opinion that would justify BOGM's opinion. A 
marshaling of the evidence fails to support BOGM's definition, and in fact compels the conclusion 
that BOGM ignored all relevant expert or scientific evidence before it to adopt, in default fashion, 
its Larson Limestone position that was formulated well before the rulemaking hearings in question. 
BOGM admits as much in its Brief. (Appellee Brief at 37.) AGCU has properly cited the relevant 
and dispositive facts, and has adequately marshaled the evidence from the Record. A correction-of-
17 
error standard of review was appropriate to this case, since it involved: (1) a question of BOGM's 
expansion of its own subject matter jurisdiction; (2) BOGM's interpretation of general law in 
defining statutory terms of general and prospective application; and (3) BOGM's definition of 
jurisdictional terms did not involve factfinding applicable to a particular case or controversy, but 
canvassed expert and lay opinion for a rule of general and prospective effect. BOGM's Rule would 
fail to even satisfy BOGM's proposed intermediate "reasonableness" standard of review, since: (1) 
it expands BOGM's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) its definition is not geologically based does not 
comport with the overall purpose of the Act; and (3) this Court has never adopted nor approved the 
definition advocated by BOGM. Finally, discovery may be necessary should the statements of 
Representative Christensen or the internal documents relied upon by BOGM but not included in the 
Record ever become material issues of fact. For the foregoing reasons as well as the reasons 
discussed in AGCU's initial Brief, BOGM's Rule, as well as the lower court's ruling upholding the 
Rule, should be overturned. 
DATED this ffi day of November, 2000. 
KESLER & RUST 
sephC. Rust o eph> 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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